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      On Humor and Incongruity 
                      Robert L. Latta 
   John Allen Paulos's book Mathematics and Humor represents a 
major advance in our understanding of the logical structure of humor. In 
this paper, I shall, however, concentrate not on Paulos's many remarkable 
insights, but rather on what I take to be his major error. His major 
error, I think, lies in his espousal of a general incongruity theory of 
humor. It is an error into which many theorists of humor fall. 
   Having made a brief review of the history of theories of humor, 
Paulos states the incongruity theory in the following rather rough  way  : 
      Most of the theorists I have cited (as well as those not quoted 
   here) agree, once allowance is made for different ways of putting 
   things and different emphases, that a necessary ingredient of humor is 
   that two (or more) incongruous ways of viewing something (a person,
   a sentence, a situation) be juxtaposed. In other words, for something 
   to be funny, some unusual, inappropriate, or odd aspects of it must 
   be perceived together and compared. We have seen that different 
   writers have emphasized different  oppositions  : expectation versus 
   surprise, the mechanical versus the spiritual, superiority versus incom-
   petence, balance versus exaggeration, and propriety versus vulgarity. 
   I will henceforth use the word "incongruity" in an extended sense 
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   comprising all the above oppositions. 
He proceeds to suggest a "loose definition of humor," which runs as 
 follows  :  "Together  .  .  .  , two ingredients—a perceived incongruity with a 
point and an appropriate emotional climate—seem to be both necessary and 
                     3 
sufficient for humor." This entails that incongruity (or, if you wish, 
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what might be called incongruity in the eye of the beholder) is a necessary 
condition of humor. For the purposes of this paper, the general incon-
gruity theory of humor is to be understood to be simply  this  :  In some 
cases, the contemplation of an incongruity yields a humorous effect, and 
in the final analysis, this is the only way at all in which humorous effects 
arise. One might, of course, try to specify in what cases the contempla-
tion of an incongruity yields a humorous effect. Paulos, for example, in 
the passage quoted just above, claims that the incongruity must "have a 
point" and that the emotional climate must be right. 
   The question to be attacked here is simply this. Is the general incon-
gruity theory of humor sound? By way of casting doubt on it, I shall now 
present what would appear to be two counterexamples to the claim that 
incongruity is a necessary condition of humor. First, then, Groucho Marx 
quipped, referring to a safari in  Africa  : "We shot two bucks, but that 
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was all the money we had." Here, the listener makes a transition from 
one interpretation of "we shot two bucks" to another, entirely different 
interpretation. But these two interpretations are not  incongruous  : they 
are simply very different. They are as different as, but no more incon-
gruous than, the following pair of  statements  : (1) "We shot two male 
 antelopes"; (2) "On an impulse, we spent all our money on beer." Nor is 
it incongruous to spend or to speak of spending money impulsively while 
on safari. It is by no means clear that incongruity plays any role at 
all in this case. There is, moreover, reason to suspect that in many cases 
in which incongruity does figure, it figures incidentally, not essentially. 
To take an amusing example from Woody  Allen  : "Not only is there no 
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God, but try getting a plumber on weekends." There is incongruity 
here, in that one expects to encounter a statement parallel to "there is 
no God," i.e., a statement of a fundamental ground of human helplessness 
and suffering, and instead, surprisingly, encounters a flip statement of a 
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real but minor  frustration  : what one encounters does not fit in with 
what one expects to encounter. It would appear , however, that Allen's 
remark is funny not because it involves this incongruity but rather because , 
to put the point in the most general terms, the first half, up to the comma, 
establishes a mood or emotional set that  is, so to speak , undermined by 
the second half. In the right circumstances, any statement or act which 
in this way undermines a mood or emotional state or an effort will be 
funny, whether or not an incongruity is  involved. To claim that the 
reader or listener responds to the incongruity in this case is to claim 
that he considers his now extinguished state of expectation, considers 
that which he has in fact encountered—for these are the two incongruous 
factors—and compares or combines them. This, however, is a most  doubt-
ful proposition. There is strong reason to suspect, then , that in this 
particular case the incongruity involved is incidental to the humorous effect, 
i.e., that it is not what creates that effect. 
   Two aspects of the present approach that have already figured in the 
discussion ought to be stated explicitly at this point. First , in the course 
of criticizing the incongruity theory of humor, I shall assume the truth of 
a certain account of the psychodynamics of humor. This account was 
advocated by Arthur Koestler; it might be called the arousal-reduction 
account, although this is not Koestler's term. The arousal-reduction 
account states that the humor-response—laughing, smiling, or a purely 
mental counterpart of these if there is such a thing—occurs when the 
cognitive processes that support a state of arousal are interrupted , and 
functions as a means of reducing that arousal. 
   Secondly, it's important to bear in mind that not every difference 
constitutes an incongruity. The question is not whether contrasts or 
transitions are essential to humor, but whether incongruity, i.e., inconsis-
tency, inharmony, or disagreement is essential . Here a problem arises in 
                                  - 132 -
                                             On Humor and Incongruity 
that the meaning of the word "incongruity" is remarkably vague. It 
might be helpful to quote Webster's Third at this point. It defines "incon-
gruous"—the definition is far more informative than that of  "incongruity"— 
as follows : 
   • • • lacking  congruity  : as (a) characterized by lack of harmony, con-
   sistency, or compatibility with one another (— colors) (— desires) 
   (b) characterized by disagreement or lack of conformity with  some-
   thing (conduct  — with avowed principles) (c) characterized by inconsis-
   tency or inharmony of its own parts or qualities (an — story) (d)  char-
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   acterized by lack of propriety or suitableness  (— manners) 
   Before moving to general theoretical considerations, it would perhaps 
be well to examine specific cases and types of cases of incongruity and 
humor. First, let us consider, one by one, the various "oppositions" that 
Paulos lists in the quotation  above  : "expectation versus surprise, the 
mechanical versus the spiritual, superiority versus incompetence, balance 
versus exaggeration, and propriety versus vulgarity." 
   One forms the expectation of encountering X, but to his surprise 
encounters Y instead (where X and Y can be particular things, things of 
certain types, etc.). Clearly, this sequence of events often figures in the 
experience of humor, and it has been admitted that it involves incongruity 
of a sort, in that what one encounters does not fit in with one's expecta-
tions. But does this incongruity figure in the psychodynamic workings 
of the cases in question, i.e., those jokes or humorous occurrences in 
which the jester or circumstances lead one to expect X but present one 
instead with Y? The case of the Woody Allen quip, discussed above, leads 
one strongly to suspect that in many cases of the type in question, the 
answer is no. That is to say, in many cases, humor arises out of unful-
filled expectations but does not stem from the incongruity between what 
was expected and what is encountered. Indeed, it might be very difficult 
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to hit upon an example of humor classifiable as an instance of "expectation 
versus surprise" in which the humor flows from the incongruity between 
expectation and actual encounter. As suggested above with reference to 
the Woody Allen quip, such an example would constitute a case in which 
one considers one's now extinguished state of expecting X, considers one's 
encounter with Y, compares or combines the two, and in so doing notices 
the incongruity between them. But ordinarily, of course, when one's 
expectations surprisingly go unfulfilled, one does no such  thing  : one 
simply expects, perceives or realizes, and is surprised. 
   As for "the mechanical versus the spiritual," it's important to make 
clear just what is meant by "the mechanical" and "the spiritual." Perhaps 
the point Paulos wishes to make by means of this distinction is simply 
that it is incongruous for a human being to behave as if he were an  auto-
maton, and that when a human being does behave in this way—when, 
for example, a man goosesteps swinging stiff arms for the amusement of 
his children—the humorous effect, if any, arises from this incongruity. 
There may be some truth in this. On the other hand, there is room for 
doubt, even in cases of this sort, as to whether the humorous effect 
really stems from the incongruity. Perhaps, in some cases, the  psycho-
dynamics show the pattern described in the following example. The presence 
of the father gives rise to a series of feelings and to a certain emotional 
set and activates attitudes  of, respect, fear, or whatever in his  children  ; 
but the  automaton-like behavior renders these feelings and attitudes 
momentarily inappropriate and unsustainable, and thus they are spilled in 
laughter. In this case, what is essential to the humorous effect is this 
undermining of prevailing  feeling  : this, and not any incongruity, is what 
causes laughter. Again, perhaps in some cases the psychodynamics show 
the following pattern. For the children, to see the father behaving like 
an automaton is to see something that does not fit in with previous ex-
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perience, something that cannot immediately be "mentally processed," as it 
were; because this phenomenon cannot immediately be processed, it brings 
about a temporary breakdown of ongoing mental effort, and the arousal 
entailed by this effort is thus released in laughter. But in this case, 
fundamentally, it is not the incongruous character, not the clash of two 
aspects that don't go together, but the "unprocessable" character of the 
stimulus that brings on the humor response. The incongruity amounts to 
a novelty, the novelty is unprocessable, and the humor response occurs 
because it is unprocessable. 
   On the other hand, the expressions "the mechanical" and "the spir-
itual" might be given a somewhat different interpretation. To borrow a 
distinction from P. F. Strawson, they might be taken to refer respectively 
to what might be called the purely physical aspect and the spiritual aspect 
of a human being. A person does have both these  aspects  : a man might 
weigh 160 lbs. and have thick fingers (facts which pertain to his purely 
physical aspect), and walk with a  dignified stride and enjoy jazz music 
(facts which pertain to his spiritual aspect). But it is important to 
note that the circumstance of having both a purely physical aspect and a 
spiritual aspect does not represent an incongruity. These two aspects 
are not incongruous in Webster's sense (a), nor, perhaps even more 
clearly, are they incongruous in sense (b), (c), or (d). Indeed, there is 
congruity as between having a beautiful body and being proud of one's 
appearance. In a given person, it is likely that many purely physical and 
spiritual elements go together very well, are the opposite of incongruous. 
Perhaps it should be added that the purely physical side of a person is 
not to be despised. It cannot be said without qualification that this side 
is the "lower" and the spiritual side the "higher," for it is easy to imagine 
cases in which, at least from certain points of view, a person is physically 
magnificent but spiritually trite or repulsive. In many cases, humor arises 
                                  — 135 —
 Ott-*-ff9tiiEXI70-1 
because a "low" aspect of a person (or an event that makes a person look 
"low") contrasts with a "high" aspect . But the "low" aspect may be 
purely physical and the "high" aspect spiritual, or the "low" aspect spiritual 
and the "high" aspect purely physical, or they may both be purely phys-
ical or both spiritual. 
   The case of the dignified official who slips on a banana peel and falls 
also involves mechanical and "spiritual" aspects. But this is quite unlike 
the case in which a man goosesteps and swings his arms for a  laugh. In 
this latter case, the man behaves like an automaton, while in the former, 
in this sense of "behave," the man does not behave at all, i.e., does not 
choose, does not act deliberately in falling. There is an incongruity 
in the case of the official in that falling is undignified—perhaps in that it 
represents a loss of  control—and thus is incongruous  with respect to the 
official's established dignity. But why is his fall funny? When one sees 
the official walking along in his dignified way on his dignified business, 
one feels a mixture of respect, envy, fear, hostility, or whatever. But 
when one sees him fall, one cannot sustain these feelings, because he has 
ceased momentarily to be  an object capable of sustaining them, and thus, 
as it were, they are spilled in a smile or in laughter. What is essential 
here is that feelings are aroused and then the support for them removed. 
Any way of removing the support for  these feelings will create the humor-
ous effect—i.e., any way that does not simultaneously stifle the laughter 
response. If someone pulls out a  pistol and shoots the official dead, this 
might well change our feelings towards him without bringing on laughter. 
In the humorous case, it is the undermining of feeling, and not the  in-
congruity involved, that is essential. It would appear that the incongruity 
here is merely incidental. 
   To move on to the next opposition, "superiority versus incompetence," 
in those cases in which a person laughs upon suddenly perceiving himself 
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as superior, just why does he laugh? What are the psychodynamics of 
his  laughter  ? Precisely what sort of state of arousal is it that his laughter 
serves to deflate? There is perhaps some truth to the following conjec-
ture. Most people, perhaps all normal people, are frequently attacked by 
doubts about themselves and often labor under feelings of inadequacy, and 
these negative feelings are undermined when one suddenly and unexpect-
edly comes to perceive himself as superior. Now my sudden perception 
that I am superior may well be unexpected, but there does not appear to 
be anything incongruous in the case. Consider the following case. I see 
a toy dog in a shop window, then suddenly realize that it's not a toy 
dog but a live dog. Here, my mind makes a sudden, unexpected transi-
tion from seeing things in one way to seeing them in another, but this 
transition entails no incongruity. In the case of superiority humor, I 
make a sudden transition from seeing myself as inadequate to seeing 
myself as superior, but there is no more incongruity here than in the 
case of the dog. Now perhaps, if we stretch the meaning of the term 
"incongruity" far enough , we can say that whenever there is a mental 
transition of this sort, there is an incongruity, in that the new perception 
does not match the old one. But even under this definition, if, in cases 
of superiority humor, one's laughter represents a laughing away of  feel-
ings of inadequacy, then one laughs not because one has perceived an 
incongruity, but rather because one's feelings of inadequacy have, as it 
were, been undermined. What is essential to the humor here is not the 
perception of an incongruity, but the transition from a way of thinking 
which, as it were, supports a certain state of feeling to a different way 
of thinking which does not support that state of feeling. Perhaps it is 
worth pointing out, too, that if I laugh because I perceive myself to be 
superior and another to be incompetent, then what I perceive to be supe-
rior is one thing and what I perceive to be incompetent  another  : they 
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are not two aspects of one thing. 
    Now for the opposition that Paulos calls "balance versus exaggeration ." 
Caricature, satire, and parody fall under this heading . For the sake of 
brevity, I shall use the word "caricature" to cover all three of these 
forms. Now obviously, in order to appreciate a caricature as a carica-
ture, it's necessary to be aware of the original and to see that original 
in the caricature. Moreover, any good caricature, that is, any that would 
appeal to an intellectually  able and emotionally mature mind , is based on 
parts or aspects of the original that are genuinely, or are sincerely felt 
to be, ugly, weak, distasteful, unpleasant, morally repugnant , hateful, 
or, at least, odd or unusual. If a caricature does not play on real or 
perceived weaknesses of the original, but depicts bad points that the 
original isn't perceived to have at all,  then, to the extent that the audience 
is able and mature, there will be no genuine humorous effect . On the 
other hand, to a mind that is both crude and hostile , any depiction of 
the original that is easily recognizable and includes ugly features might well 
be funny. 
   Let us ask how caricature works. I shall consider the cases of hostile 
satire and gentle parody. These two forms are not , perhaps, exhaustive 
of the genre in question, but I shall take them to be representative . 
Perhaps, then, the following simple account of the workings of successful 
hostile satire is near the mark. The audience feels hostile , or is newly 
made to feel hostile, towards the original , for otherwise the satire does 
not succeed. The audience, being hostile, feels an urge to make a telling 
attack on the object in question or at least participate vicariously in such 
an attack, but is more or less frustrated by an inability or lack of oppor -
tunity to do so. The satirist selects genuinely weak , ugly, or hateful parts 
or aspects of the object, or ones perceived as being so, and brings these 
into prominence in a clever and telling way. This , of course, constitutes 
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an attack, and the attack is perceived as  damaging.. The pent-up hostility 
and frustration or newly aroused hostility is thus rendered, to borrow a 
term from Koestler, redundant, at least for the moment, and so is released 
in laughter or a smile. In the case of the crude and hostile mind, even 
a random attribution of ugly or hateful attributes or actions may be per-
ceived as a successful attack, and thus the same effect is produced. The 
case of gentle parody is not fundamentally different from this. Think 
of a parody of a social group written by  a member of that group to 
bring amusement and to correct gently—e.g., a parody of Yuppies by a 
Yuppie for an audience of Yuppies  that plays lightly on the self-centered 
striving and cool calculation that are characteristic of that group. If the 
parody is skillfully done, then, of course, it will bring laughter and smiles, 
perhaps more of the latter than the former, from members of the group 
and sympathetic nonmembers. Surely, at least for some people, the 
psychodynamics here work more or less in the following way. The 
parody brings about a sudden recognition or recall of minor faults, or 
faults perceived as minor. In a small way, within the context of general 
approval that prevails, and perhaps only momentarily, this recognition 
undermines confidence in the soundness of the group's values and way of 
life, and so a little of this feeling is released in smiling or laughter. 
   Now what does incongruity have to do with the humorous effect in 
cases of this sort? To begin with, the caricature itself need not contain 
any incongruity. Thus, for example, a visual caricature might feature a 
drawing of a man with a somewhat big nose and a very heavy beard, 
but there is no incongruity in having such a nose or beard. Moreover, 
it is stretching a point to say that a caricature must be incongruous with 
respect to its original. For in some cases the caricature is just a little 
different from the original, the nose just a little bigger or the beard just a 
little heavier or whatnot, but differences like these do not yield  incongru-
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ity according to the ordinary usage of the term. If a photograph of a 
person's face, for example, gives a slightly inaccurate impression, one 
doesn't on that account say that the photograph is incongruous, for that 
would be overstatement. It is necessary to bear in mind that not every 
difference represents or yields an incongruity. Moreover , even with 
respect to those cases of caricature that do involve true incongruity, it 
is questionable whether the incongruity often plays a fundamental role. 
Fundamentally, a caricature is funny because in one way or another it 
undermines feeling or aborts mental effort provoked or sustained by 
the original. It is the transition from a way of perceiving that sustains 
to one that undermines feeling or effort that is fundamental. Imagine , 
for example, a visual caricature in which the head of Ronald Reagan is 
attached to the body of an infant which is playing with toy missles. The 
point, of course, whether or not well taken, is that Reagan is ignorant 
and careless about nuclear arms. Clearly, this caricature is effective, for 
those for whom it is, not on account of the incongruity of attaching the 
head of an adult to the body of an infant, and not because Ronald Reagan 
doesn't really look like this and doesn't really play with toys,  i.e., not 
because in certain respects the drawing doesn't match the original, but 
rather because with a little effort, one suddenly perceives that a telling 
attack has taken place, and this precipitates a release of feeling. It is in 
fact a sudden perception of congruity that leads to the humor response 
here. One who doesn't see the point of the caricature simply doesn't 
understand the caricature at all, however much incongruity he may see. 
   As for the opposition "propriety versus vulgarity," let us ask why 
it is that a vulgar act in a context of propriety sometimes elicits laughter. 
Typically, the maintenance of propriety requires a degree of self-control 
and self-denial, and successful self-control and self-denial in turn give rise 
to a certain level of frustration. Perhaps, then, in many cases, a vulgar act 
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committed in a context of propriety creates a humorous effect in that, 
by momentarily establishing a vulgar  and hence more relaxed context, it 
permits the release of the frustration and tense feelings that attend the 
effort to act correctly. In other cases, perhaps, a vulgar act performed 
in response to a superficially proper one represents a successful act of 
defiance against a feared or hated figure. This might be funny to an 
audience involved to the right degree. There are, no doubt, other sorts 
of humor that come under the heading "propriety versus vulgarity." It 
appears reasonable to conjecture, however, that in most or all cases that 
come under this heading, that which is fundamental to the humorous 
effect is not the perception of incongruities, but rather, once again, the 
undermining of feeling and the aborting of effort. This includes those 
cases in which humor stems from the occurrence of nonfunctioning 
propriety in a context of functioning vulgarity. 
   Next, let us consider a number of humorous items and types of 
humorous items that Paulos presents and apparently takes to be clear-
cut examples of incongruity humor. To begin with, he  writes  : 
       Idiot and misunderstanding jokes usually are good illustrations of 
   both superiority and incongruity theories of  humor Two idiots, one 
 tall, skinny, and bald, the other short and fat, come out of a tavern. 
   As they start toward home a bird flies over and defecates on the 
   bald man's head. The short man says he's going back to the tavern 
   for toilet paper, whereupon the tall one observes, "No, don't do 
   that. The bird's probably a mile away by now." 
      A fat man (brother to the one in the previous joke) sits down 
   to dinner with a whole meat loaf on his plate. His wife asks whether 
   she should cut it into four or eight pieces. He replies, "Oh, four,  8 
    I guess, I'm trying to lose weight." 
The first of these two jokes is, in a way, rather complex. At least the 
following factors enter into its workings. (1) For some people at least, 
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the very mention of idiots, and the tall idiot's failure to understand what 
the short idiot has in mind, create a feeling of superiority and relaxation 
in the way already explained. (2) The contrast of body types between 
the two idiots accentuates the point that each is far from the mean  phys-
ically and is physically unattractive, and this in turn reinforces feelings 
of superiority. (3) For some listeners, to be sure—people who have not 
recently been embarrassed in similar ways—the embarrassing situation 
of the tall idiot further reinforces feelings of superiority. (4) To a small but 
significant extent, the effort to figure out what the tall idiot is thinking 
when he replies that the bird is probably a mile away already entails an 
increase in tension, and the absurdity of his thinking, once recognized, 
serves in a thorough and effective way to undermine this tension. Now 
of these four factors, the first three have nothing to do with incongruity. 
As for the fourth, the idiot's final remark shows that he thinks that if 
the bird were not so far away, it would make sense to use toilet paper 
on it. Now it can indeed be said to be unfitting to use toilet paper on 
birds, and for this reason the joke under discussion can be said to 
involve an incongruity. But the reason it is unfitting to wipe birds with 
toilet paper is that it would take a considerable and perhaps unpleasant 
effort to do so and would accomplish nothing—i.e., it would be pointless 
or absurd. This absurdity is basic, and the incongruity derivative. It 
would appear safe to say that it is to this blatant absurdity rather than 
to the derivative and faint incongruity in the case that people react when 
they hear the joke. As for the meat-loaf joke, one might say that the 
man's way of reasoning is incongruous with respect to the way reality 
works, or the facts of nature. But what does this have to do with the 
psychodynamics of the case? Surely hardly anyone, if anyone at all, hits 
upon this rather difficult, abstract, philosophical conception in the course 
of processing the joke mentally and  reacting to it. Rather, the audience 
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makes an effort to understand the man's thinking, and when that thinking 
proves to be absurd, the tension entailed by that effort, and perhaps a 
degree of general tension in addition, is released in a chuckle. 
   In a chapter entitled "Axioms, Levels, and Iteration," Paulos  writes  : 
       The formal structure of  [certain] stories or jokes is as follows.
 Joke-teller  : "In what model are axioms 1, 2, and 3 true ?"  Listener  : 
   "In model M."  Joke-teller  : "No, in model N." The following classic 
   burlesque joke is an  example  .  .  .  . The dirty old man leers at the 
   innocent young virgin and says, "What goes in hard and dry and comes 
   out soft and wet?" The girl blushes and stammers, "Well, let's see, 
 uh  .  .  . ,  "  to which the dirty old man replies wickedly, "chewing gum." 
   In other words, "model N" in our formal example and "chewing gum" 
   (more accurately the whole scenario suggested by chewing gum) in 
   our burlesque joke play the role of an unexpected and incongruous
   model of the given "axioms." 
Several pages farther on, he  adds  : 
       Riddles also have the same formal structure as the type of joke 
   just discussed. "What has properties Al, A2, and A3 ?" "M" (or 
   sometimes "I don't know"). "No, N." Homonyms often play a role 
   in riddles as well. Consider the very common  riddle  : "What's black 
    and white and red all over?" "A newspaper." Frequently, of course, 
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   there is more than one incongruous interpretation for a riddle. 
Paulos's analysis here in terms of axiom systems and models is sound and 
most illuminating. But is he correct to maintain that the idea of chewing 
gum represents an incongruous association to the words "it goes in hard 
and dry and comes out soft and wet?" Or is this idea merely a different 
association from the one that comes to mind immediately? In the case of 
this joke, a sexual association laden with feeling enters the mind of the 
listener immediate y, an entirely different, nonsexual association, one not 
laden with much emotional significance, is suggested, and this suggestion 
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undermines the tension entailed by the first association. There is indeed 
a transition from one thought or set of thoughts to another, but incon-
gruity plays no part in the case. Compare this case with one in which 
incongruity does truly play a  role  : A cute little girl bites into a cookie 
and suddenly says in an uncharacteristic, loud, rough, very adult voice, 
 "Ah  ! I really needed  that  !" He re, her way of speaking is not merely 
different from her usual way, but is incongruous  with, respect to what 
she is. In this case, the humor arises at least in part and at least 
indirectly out of the circumstance that truly incongruous elements are 
encountered in the same thing (the little girl). As for riddles, it ought to 
be questioned whether different "interpretations for" (clever answers to) a 
riddle are incongruous, or just different. 
   In his chapter "Humor, Grammar, and Philosophy," Paulos  writes  : 
       If we stretch things a bit, a relational reversal, the interchange 
   of two objects or people standing in a certain relation to each other, 
 may  .  .  . count as a kind of generalized nonlinguistic spoonerism. Thus, 
   for example, a greyhound dog with a bus tattooed on its  side  .  .  . is 
   a relational  reversal.  .  . . 
      Reversals of this kind are often humorous because they force us 
   to perceive in quick succession the familiar relation and an unfamiliar
                                   10 
   (and therefore incongruous) one. 
The point concerning spoonerisms is surely well taken. As for Paulos's 
concrete example, a cartoon drawing of a  greyhound dog with a bus 
tattooed on its side is funny partly because the symbol (the bus) is inane. 
In the real world, there is a serious point to painting the greyhound-
emblem on a bus, but, at least in the context of the cartoon, there is no 
serious point to tattooing the bus-emblem on the dog. The small effort 
of thought required to recognize the relational reversal brings about a 
small increase in tension, and the inanity in question serves to undermine 
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this and general tension. But what role does incongruity play in this 
case? It appears safe to guess that the bus-tattoo on the dog stimulates 
momentary puzzlement and an effort of thought directed towards resolving 
that puzzlement, and this in turn, as already said, entails a small increase 
in tension that is subsequently released. In the case of this cartoon, 
then, an incongruity sets in motion a train of events that leads to the 
humor response. But this gives no more reason for citing the cartoon as 
an instance of incongruity humor than for citing it as an instance of 
relational-reversal humor or inanity humor. 
   In the course of a generally enlightening discussion of the logical 
structure of nonverbal humor, Paulos  writes  : "The dignified movements 
of Charlie Chaplin clash humorously with his appearance as a powerless 
            11 
little man." But is there a clash here, or rather an undermining of 
respectful  attitudes  ? One who speaks of an undermining of respectful 
attitudes has this in  mind  : Chaplin's "dignified movements" establish 
an initial state of respect, but when the audience notices "his appearance 
as a powerless little man," the basis for its respect dissolves. But what 
is meant by  a clash? The perception that two things don't go together? 
But why should this give rise to smiling or laughter? Does the 
perception of Chaplin's dignified aspect play  the same role in eliciting 
laughter as does the perception of his  powerlessness? Apparently not. 
But if the humor in this case arises from the sort of clashing that Paulos 
appears to have in mind, then the answer to this question is yes. 
   It would be helpful at this point to make two distinctions which, it 
appears safe to say, apply to most or all theories of humor and theore-
tical analyses of individual items of humor. First, there is a distinction to 
be made between symmetrical and asymmetrical accounts. Most accounts 
of the psychodynamics of humor assume the existence of two or more 
basic dynamic factors (for the sake of simplification, I shall for the  most 
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part conduct my presentation in terms of two factors). For example, 
in the case of incongruity theories, these two factors are the two things 
or two aspects of a thing or situation that are incongruous with respect 
to one another; in the case of Koestler's theory, they are the event, 
statement, or whatnot that establishes a state of tension, and that which 
undermines that tension. As the expression shall be used here, 
symmetrical accounts are those according to which these two factors play 
the same role in the psychodynamics of humor or of a particular item of 
humor, and asymmetrical accounts are those according to which they play 
different roles. Thus, for example, Koestler's theory is asymmetrical in 
that according to it, factor  A and factor B play very different roles in 
the psychodynamics of any item of  humor  : factor A establishes a state 
of tension, and factor B precipitates a sudden release of that tension. 
Next, there is a quite different distinction to be made among static, 
two-way transitional, and one-way transitional accounts. As the expression 
shall be used here, according to static accounts, there is no essential 
transfer of attention from either of the two factors to the  other  : they 
are simply beheld together. According to two-way transitional accounts, 
the reader's or listener's attention moves back and forth between the 
two factors A and B, and—this is crucial—moving from A to B has 
essentially the same effect as moving from B to A. According to 
one-way transitional accounts, what is essential is a transition of attention 
from factor A to factor  B: this is what brings about the humorous 
effect. The listener might transfer his attention back from B to A in 
order to check his comprehension, but this by no means has the same 
effect as moving from A to B. 
   Now how do these distinctions apply to Paulos's reasoning? By way 
of illustration, it would be instructive to apply them to his account of puns. 
This reads as  follows  : 
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      Consider the following two  puns  ; "Colds can be positive or nega-
   tive. Sometimes the ayes have it, sometimes the nose."  Interviewer  : 
   "Do you consider clubs appropriate for small children ?" W. C.  Fields  : 
   "Only when kindness fails ." In the first, "ayes" and "nose" provide 
   a link between the word cluster having to do with parliamentary 
   rules and that relating to cold symptoms. In the second, which is 
   funnier (probably because it is more aggressive), "clubs" can refer
   either to Little League, Girl Scouts, and other social organizations or 
   to blunt instruments, beating, and so on. 
      Like the relational reversal, a pun forces one to perceive in 
   quick succession two incongruous and unrelated sets of  ideas.  .  . .
      A convenient way to conceive of puns is in terms of the inter-
   section of two sets. A pun is a word or phrase that belongs to two or 
   more distinct universes of discourse and thus brings both to mind. The 
   humor, if there is any, results from the inappropriate and incongruous 
   sets of associated ideas jarring each other. Thus the W. C. Fields 
   pun related above can be pictured as in figure 19 [i.e., by means of 
   a Venn diagram consisting of two overlapping  circles  : the circle on 
   the left is labelled Little League, Social organizations, Girl Scouts, 
   the one on the right, Blunt instruments, Beating, Misanthropy, and 
   the area of overlap, Clubs], where the word clubs can be seen as 
   forcing one to juxtapose the two unrelated sets of ideas. The energy
   flow, so to speak, is from left to right in the diagram, as [sic] clubs 
                                                     12 
   serves as a slide down which the laughter falls. 
First, a few miscellaneous remarks. Clearly, a pun does not merely 
present two things in  succession  : it presents two things in succession 
by bringing about an interpretation switch. Moreover, a pun does not 
necessarily indicate any respect in which two things are  related  ; in this 
sense, it does not necessarily link two things. In the cases of the two 
puns quoted by Paulos, the only links that are established lie on the 
level of words, not that of things. The spoken sentence "Sometimes the 
(ayes/eyes) have it" can be used to say something about parliamentary 
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debates or something entirely different and unconnected about colds , but 
this pun does not suggest any connection at all between parliamentary 
debates and  colds  ; similarly for the Fields pun. Nevertheless, to be sure , a 
pun might be used to draw attention to an unobvious connection among 
things or events. 
   Now let us consider the W. C. Fields pun in detail. The arousal-
reduction account of its psychodynamics is, to begin with, asymmetrical. 
According to this account, factor A, the question whether social clubs 
are a good thing for young children, establishes a sort of cognitive arousal, 
and factor B, the idea of using heavy sticks to beat rambunctious young 
children once kindness has failed, or, perhaps, a mental image of W. C. 
Fields miming the action of doing so, serves to precipitate the release of 
that arousal in a chuckle. Thus, according to the arousal-reduction account, 
factor A and factor B play different roles in the psychodynamics of the 
case. This account is, moreover, a one-way transitional  account  : it is a 
transition of attention from the question whether social clubs are a good 
thing for young  children (factor A) to a mental image of W. C. Fields 
pretending to beat noisy young children with a heavy stick, or whatever 
(factor B) that creates the humorous effect. Moving back to reconsider 
factor A might aid one's comprehension, but this in itself, according 
to the present account, does not trigger any humorous response at all. 
Now let us ask what characteristics a pure, uncompromising incongruity 
account of the Fields pun would have—i.e., would it be symmetrical or 
asymmetrical, static, one-way transitional, or two-way  transitional  ? To 
begin with, it would be, at least fundamentally, symmetrical. For accord-
ing to a pure incongruity account, factor A contributes to the humorous 
effect  in that it is a term of an incongruity, factor B does likewise, 
and thus, fundamentally, they play the same role in bringing about the 
humorous effect. A pure incongruity account would also be at least 
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fundamentally static. Basically, an incongruity is something taken in all 
at  once  ; hence, if the humorous effect stems simply from the contemplation 
of an incongruity, then any mental transition between  factOr A and factor 
B, the terms of the incongruity, is inessential. It might be necessary to 
look or think back and forth a few times between A and B to get the 
incongruity firmly in mind, but according to the theory in question, it is 
not this  back-and-forth transition, but rather the recognition of the incon-
gruity, that is essential. It is perhaps especially clear that a pure 
incongruity account would not be one-way transitional. 
   Now let us ask how Paulos's account of the Fields pun is to be char-
acterized. It appears fair to say that it is at once a symmetrical and an 
asymmetrical account. His talk of "incongruous" sets of ideas "jarring 
each other" strongly suggests a symmetrical account, i.e., one according 
to which the two factors in question play the same role in generating the 
humor. On the other hand, his talk of an "energy flow" suggests that 
within the context of this pun, thoughts of social clubs represent a "high 
energy area" and thoughts of beating people with sticks a "low energy 
area" to which energy flows as water flows down a hill, and this picture, 
whatever its precise import, strongly suggests an asymmetrical account 
according to which the two factors in question play quite different roles 
in the psychodynamics of the case. Paulos, then, appears to waver between 
a symmetrical and an asymmetrical account. Likewise, he appears to 
waver between a two-way transitional account (his talk of the two 
relevant factors "jarring each other"), and a one-way transitional account 
(his talk of an "energy flow," which suggests that what is essential is a 
one-way transfer of attention from factor A to factor B). In that sym-
metrical and asymmetrical accounts are mutually contradictory and two-way 
transitional and one-way transitional accounts are likewise mutually con-
tradictory, Paulos's account is incoherent in these two fundamental respects. 
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One suspects that he has mixed a pure incongruity account of the Fields 
pun with a nonincongruity arousal-reduction account. 
   Paulos's account of the  Fields pun, then, appears to have two incon-
sistent sides or aspects. It can be argued that as he has stated them, both 
these sides contain errors. To begin with, under the right conditions, 
the juxtaposition of the idea of forming social clubs for young children with 
that of using heavy sticks to beat young children might indeed be felt 
to be incongruous. The right conditions are conditions that encourage 
comparison and contrast and an effort to combine these two ideas into a 
harmonious whole  of some sort. Now it is clear that one who follows 
and appreciates the Fields pun does indeed make a mental  transition  : he 
or she first thinks of social clubs for young children, and then imagines 
W. C. Fields or someone else pretending to beat or beating young children 
with a stick. But to make a mental transition from one image or thought 
to another, however jarring that transition might be, and to compare, 
contrast, and try to combine those two images or thoughts, are two very 
different things. But if one does not compare, contrast, and try to 
combine them, one does not appreciate any incongruity that may lie in 
their juxtaposition. In the case of the Fields pun, introspection leads me 
to think that if there is any comparing or contrasting of the two images 
or thoughts in question, or any attempt to combine them into a harmon-
ious whole, this is inessential to the humorous effect. But if this is so, 
then it is inessential to notice any incongruity that might be felt to lie in 
their juxtaposition. A further question arises. Even if one does recognize, 
and, as it were, feel an incongruity here, why should this incongruity be 
funnier than, say, the sight of two unrelated photographs sitting side by 
side on a mantlepiece, or the sight of an expensive pen and a cheap one 
pinned side by side in a shirt pocket? There just isn't anything very 
comical in the mere juxtaposition of an image of a man using a stick 
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to beat children with the question of social clubs for children, however 
suddenly and cleverly this juxtaposition is effected. 
   Secondly, to turn once more to the Venn diagram of the Fields pun, 
it is perhaps misleading to say, as Paulos does, that the energy flow is 
from left to right, for this suggests that considerable energy flows, as it 
were, into the idea of beating children with sticks—i.e., these words can 
be taken to imply that the audience makes a transition from thinking 
seriously of social clubs for young children to thinking more or less 
seriously of beating children. But surely an account along lines described 
by Koestler would be more  accurate  : the energy flow is from left to 
empty space, as it were. That is, the listener starts out thinking in a more 
or less effortful way in terms of children and social clubs and the like, 
and then the tension or arousal entailed by this effort is dissipated in 
smiling or laughter. 
   It is time now to consider what general criticisms might be made of 
the incongruity theory of humor. To  begin with, recall that Paulos 
proposes to use the term "incongruity" in an extended sense in which all 
the "oppositions" he lists, "expectation versus surprise, the mechanical 
versus the spiritual, superiority versus incompetence, balance versus 
exaggeration, and propriety versus vulgarity" count as incongruities. 
As has been argued, however, the poles of these oppositions do not all 
represent incongruities in the usual sense of the term. Thus, there is no 
incongruity in having both a certain height and weight and certain 
thoughts and feelings, nor in seeing a person first as competent and then 
as incompetent or vice versa, nor does caricature necessarily involve 
incongruity. This gives reason to suspect that Paulos's proposal extends 
the meaning of the term "incongruity" dangerously far. Perhaps it would 
be a step in the right direction to speak, not simply of incongruities, 
but of oppositions, contrasts, differences, incongruities, and the like that 
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give rise to humor. A tendency to lump different things together appears 
to be characteristic of incongruity theories of humor. Thus, for example, 
Paul E. McGhee, a well-known student of children's humor who subscribes 
to a general incongruity theory, includes "absurd, unexpected, inappropriate, 
and otherwise out-of-context events" under the term "incongruous relation-
     13 
ship." But in ordinary usage, the terms "incongruous," "absurd," 
"unexpected ," "inappropriate," and "out-of-context" all mean very different 
things. One suspects that the practice of lumping such very different 
things together conceals more than it reveals. 
   This suggests a route by which a theorist might arrive at the con-
clusion that all humor is based on  incongruity  : In some cases, humor does 
clearly turn on incongruity, and this establishes the idea that there is 
some significant connection between humor on the one hand and incon-
gruity on the other. But the concept of incongruity is highly vague, and 
so it is easy to fall to extending it to the point where almost any difference 
counts as an incongruity. (Perhaps, too, there are special cases that 
encourage this extension of  the  concept  : special cases in which any signifi-
cant difference does amount to an  incongruity—e.g., sufficiently great 
variation from a standard that defines membership in a class of things.) But 
all humor does in fact involve transitions, and hence  differences among 
various elements and factors. Hence, the conclusion readily suggests itself 
that all humor involves incongruity. But this in turn suggests that 
incongruity is the basis of all humor, for, so the reasoning goes, it cannot 
be a mere coincidence that all humor involves incongruity. The only 
conclusion actually warranted by the reasoning to this point is, of course, 
the vacuous one that all humor involves differences among various 
elements and factors. But it is very easy to fall into a fatal equivocation, 
namely, that between (1) All humor involves incongruity (in a broad sense 
in which almost any difference counts as an incongruity), and  (2) All 
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humor involves incongruity (in  a limited, narrow sense). To move from 
(1) to (2)  is to move from a vacuous truth to an outright falsehood, a false-
hood that constitutes a major error in the theory of humor. Perhaps, then, 
to summarize, the general incongruity theory of humor arises from a fatal 
equivocation which in turn stems from an overextension of the concept of 
incongruity. 
   Within the context of the theory of humor, the only useful concept of 
incongruity is a narrow one. If the position that all humor involves or is 
based on incongruity is to be meaningful, i.e., not vacuous, the concept of 
incongruity must be given a relatively limited, well-defined meaning. 
   Incongruity theories which, like that of Paulos, posit a transfer of 
attention from one factor to another and a consequent release of tension 
are vulnerable to the following line of questioning. If factor A and factor 
B jointly play a single psychodynamic role in generating the humor 
response, then why is it necessary for the audience to transfer attention 
from the one to the  other? If incongruity is humorous in itself, then  tran-
sition is not essential to humor, because an incongruity can be recognized 
all at once. On the other hand, if a transfer of attention and a consequent 
release of tension are essential to humor, the question arises why either 
point in the transition need constitute an incongruity, either with respect 
to the other point, or with respect to something else, or in itself. To be 
sure, if the second point in the transition, B, constitutes an incongruity 
in itself, this might suffice to precipitate a release of tension. Likewise if 
B is incongruous with respect to A. But these observations suggest 
that incongruity is not essential to humor, for there are many things 
besides incongruity that can precipitate the requisite release of tension. 
   A great weakness of the incongruity theory of humor is that it 
contains no satisfactory account of the psychodynamics of humor. To 
say simply that incongruities are sometimes perceived as comical is to 
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explain nothing. The incongruity theory is a symmetrical, static theory, in 
the senses defined above. It is clear, however, that in very many cases, 
asymmetrical,  one-way transitional accounts decribe the psychodynamics 
involved. 
   What role, then, does incongruity play in the generation of humorous 
effects? In attacking this question, let us continue to assume the truth of 
an  arousal-reduction theory of humor of the sort to which Paulos appears 
to subscribe. Such a theory must recognize the following factors in the 
process whereby the humor response is generated. First, predisposing 
factors, that is, factors which predispose a person to take a given event 
or situation humorously rather than otherwise. Secondly, initiating factors, 
that is, factors which establish the initial state, that is, the state of arousal, 
tension, or effort that is reduced by the humor response. Thirdly, 
precipitating factors, factors that undermine the initial state and thereby 
bring on laughter, smiling, or the like. Now assuming that this framework 
is sound, it would appear that an incongruity, which is to say a whole 
that in one way or another entails an incongruity, can contribute to the 
generation of a humorous effect in only a few  ways  : (1) as a predisposing 
factor; (2) as an initiating factor that gives rise to a state of puzzlement 
or effortful thought—perhaps in some riddles the initiating factor is an 
incongruity or apparent incongruity; (3) as a precipitating factor that 
undermines seriousness or effort through absurdity. In case (2), that in 
which an incongruity functions as initiating factor, the precipitating factor 
can be either sudden success in resolving the puzzle, or a sudden 
abandonment of the effort to resolve it, due either to the perception that 
it has no solution or to the decision that the effort required is too great. 
If, however, one side of an incongruity functions as initiating factor in 
its own right and the other side functions as precipitating factor in its 
own right, then the incongruity itself does not figure essentially in the 
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psychodynamics of the case. For, given favorable predisposing conditions, 
all that is necessary are effective initiating and precipitating factors, and 
so it is not essential that the audience recognize any incongruity that their 
juxtaposition might entail. 
   In conclusion, given the plausibility of the basic arousal-reduction 
theory of humor, it is highly implausible to claim that all humor is based 
on incongruity or that incongruity is essential to humor. An incongruity 
can function as predisposing factor, initiating factor, or precipitating factor, 
but entirely nonincongruous states and events can do so also. 
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